Archives of Business Research – Vol.3, No.3
Publication Date: June 25, 2015
DOI: 10.14738/abr.33.1134.
Tarabinah, W. M., & Okolo, P. O. (2015). Dependent Militarization and Africa's Security: Analysis of Nigeria and United States Relations. *Archives of Business Research, 3(*3), 50-66.

Dependent Militarization and Africa's Security: Analysis of Nigeria and United States Relations.

DR. Wilfred M. Tarabinah
Department of Political Science, Niger Delta University
Wilberforce Island, Bayelsa State

Philips O. Okolo
Department of Political Science, Niger Delta University
Wilberforce Island,

Abstract
International politics are characterized by global military capitalism, a situation which inspires hegemons to determine the direction of the militarization programme of peripheral countries. In this study we examine the military pact between Nigeria and the United States of America. Using empirical indicators such as U.S trade and investment in Nigeria; U.S. military aid to Nigeria; incapacity of the Nigerian state to enforce international law; incapacity of the Nigerian government to mediate conflict between international actors and host communities. The study posits that Nigeria and United States government military treaty undermines the Nigeria's government capacity to enforce the liability of U.S. Corporations for the violations of international law in Nigeria.

Keywords: Dependent militarization, security, Nigeria, united states.

INTRODUCTION
The emergence of the United States as a global hegemony following the demise of the cold war and the collapse of the Soviet Union transformed the architecture of international relations. Contemporary international relations is characterized by a new regime amongst which is the unfettered match of global capitalism; international terrorism; the deepening of U.S. investments in third world markets; the U.S dependence on Africa's oil; violent conflicts in many Third World countries and dependent militarization.

It is noteworthy to mention here that during the cold war era the United States foreign policy was favourable to post colonial sovereign African nations who were sympathetic to the United States. These nations enjoyed streams of aids flow accompanied with cultural and technical assistance. Volman (1997) pointed out that through financial grants and low interest loans, the U.S. government provided more than 1.5 billion dollars in arms and other security assistance to African nations which were selected for their strategic importance for the prosecution of their cold war duet; while recalcitrant leaders were swiftly overthrown, through violent military coup d'état (Nkrumah in 1966; Sukarno and Ben Bella in 1965; Modibo Keita in 1968); at other times through overt means.

Volman, further asserted that the U.S. government conducted air strikes against Libya, prosecuted direct military intervention in Zaire and executed covert military operations against Soviet supported government in Angola and Ethiopia. Dictatorial regimes were foist on

Africa and other developing countries. These dictatorships were often sponsored by these superpowers through their transnational corporations. MacOgonor (2001) aptly noted that the authoritarian regimes were needed in Africa, Asia and Latin America countries to suppress internal insurrections which sometimes even suppress legitimate demands.

He opined that this scenario provided the immediate context for the disregard of both municipal and international law observance in Nigeria and the rest of the Third World, which provided a suitable environment for the transnational corporations who sought to operate in environment of limited legal restriction so as to maximize profit without accountability. So in addition to their normal business operations, these global corporations also engage in covert activities in the Third World countries (especially resource endowed countries) in order to promote the interest of their home government.

Since 1945 the use of militarism to protect the flow of oil has been a central plank of U.S. foreign policy. This is indicated in the meeting between president Franklin Roosevelt and the Saudi King Aziz Ibn Saud on Valentine's day 1945, wherein president Roosevelt brokered a military pact guaranteeing the king that the United States will provide military protection for Saudi Arabia in return for special access to Saudi Arabia vast oil reserves (Klare, 2004). These policies were reiterated by successive presidents which were articulated in Truman, Eisenhower, Nixon and Carter doctrines. It was also expanded by Ronald Reagan in 1981 to encompass internal threat which was used to justify the Gulf war of 1990.

Oil therefore constitutes a national security issue to the United States and she has used her hegemony to not only protect its continuous flow but has also engaged in major wars as articulated from America's foreign policy in the Middle East to the Gulf of Guinea (Rowell, Marriot and Stockman, 2005; Pelletiere, 2004; Engdahl, 2004; Mann, 2003). Rowell, et. al (2005) demonstrates how America is intensying its military operations on the African continent, having successfully secured agreements with 8 to 10 African countries to allow the U.S. military to utilize air fields and other suitable sites to establish "cooperative security locations" from which it can launch military strikes.

In order to achieve this objective, the U.S. government instituted several bilateral and multilateral military cooperation in Africa; such as the Trans Saharan counter terrorism partnership (TSCTP), African contingency operation training and assistance program (ACOTA), International military education and training program (IMET), Foreign military sales program (FMS), African coastal and border security program (ACBS Program), Excess defense article program (EDA), anti-terrorism assistance (ATA), Section 1206 fund, Combined joint task force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), Naval operation in the Gulf of Guinea, Flintlock 2005 and 2007 and Joint task force Aztec silence.

This phenomenon could be described as dependent militarization understood in the context of how the direction and intensity of a country's militarization program is externally determined. Barnet &t Wendt (1992) drew a distinction between auto centric and dependent militarization by categorizing states that produces its own arms and arms technology, training and doctrines as engaging in auto centric militarization while those states that rely substantially on imported arms and arms technology and military training as engaging in dependent militarization. Rowell (2005) opined that America is quietly increasing its military presence in Nigeria; a clear manifestation is the increase of American weapons in the hands of the Nigerian army and navy in the Niger Delta region.

Fowler (1995) asserts that ninety percent of transnational companies stem from the United States and it is also well documented that there is a connection between oil corporations, militarism and antidemocratic politics in resource endowed countries (Eaton, 1997; Dommen, 1998; Mowerry, 2002; Frey, 1997; Kinley and Tadaki, 2004; Fowler, 1995; Shelton, 2002; Frynas, 2000; Cooper, 2002; Reno, 2000). This scholarship shows that transnational corporations promote conflict in order to sustain the global arms market. This illustrate what Nordstrom (2004) calls the "shadows of war," which describes the multi- trillion dollars financial networks which actively promotes conflicts, yet remains invisible. This underscores the limitation of the reach of the State in enforcing violations of international law as presently constituted (Kamminga, 2004; Paul and Garred, 2000; Le Billion, 2001; Juma, 2007) and Amnesty International (2009) empirical study on Nigeria reveals that oil transnational corporations have exacerbated conflicts and violated human rights for over 50 years in Nigeria's Niger Delta. These violations, according to the report culminated in violent destruction and sacking of entire communities and villages akin to a genocide.

This shows that the Nigerian state is caught up in the web of international capital and militarism which creates a security paradox. This defines the problematic of this study as it seeks to find out whether the military alliance between the Nigerian government and the United States government has undermine the capacity of the Nigerian government to enforce the liability of transnational corporations for violations of international law in Nigeria.

Nigeria and U.S. Trade Relations

This section analyzes a significant denominator in the economy of the United States and that of Nigeria. According to the U.S. Dept. of Energy (2003) the United States has about five percent of the world's population but consumes one fourth of the world's petroleum, which is approximately 20 million barrels per day, out of a total world consumption of eighty million barrels. In the case of Nigeria, agriculture was formerly the dominant sector of the economy which accounted for over 70 % of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and employed about 70 % of the total workforce and contributed approximately 90 % of foreign revenue, with a rob off effect on the manufacturing sector which accounted for 8.2 % from a mere 4.8 % in GDP (CBN, 2002).

This scenario however changed when oil became a globally demanded commodity which led to the emergence of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and its bargaining power which successfully transform Third World Countries into powerful cartel thereby seizing price initiative from the oil majors and Nigeria's increased awareness of international politics transformed the country into the club of oil rentier states. Oil subsequently accounted for over 90 percent of Nigeria's export income annually. In 2000 alone, Nigeria received 99.6 percent of its export income from oil (Ross, 2003). The United States depends on oil imports for industrial survival while Nigeria depends on oil export for economic survival. This stands to reason that oil commodity is a common denominator in the United States and Nigeria and that both countries are oil dependent. The table illustrates Nigeria's oil dependency.

Table 1. Showing the Twenty Most Oil Dependent Countries in 2000 (Fuel Export as a Percentage of Total Exports)

S/N	COUNTRIES	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL EXPORT
1.	NIGERIA	99.6
2.	ALGERIA	97.2
3.	SAUDI ARABIA	92.1
4.	IRAN, ISLAMIC REPUBLIC	88.5
5.	VENEZUELA, R.B	86.1
6.	AZERBAIJAN	85.1
7.	OMAN	82.5
8.	TURKMENISTAN	81.0
9.	SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC	76.3
10.	BAHRAIN	71.0
11.	TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	65.3
12.	NORWAY	63.9
13.	KAZAKSTAN	53.9
14.	RUSSIAN FEDERATION	51.3
15.	ECUADOR	49.4
16.	COLOMBIA	41.4
17.	PAPUA NEW GUINEA	28.8
18.	INDONESIA	25.4
19.	AUSTRALIA	21.9
20.	LITHUANIA	20.9

SOURCE: Ross, M. (2003:19) Nigeria's Oil Sector and the Poor in Nigeria: Drivers of Change Program. UK: DFID

This shows Nigeria's extraordinary dependence on oil export; in 2000 alone 99 percent of its income was derived from oil which indicated that she is the most oil dependent country in the world and that its non-oil exports were significantly small. According to Ross (2003) between 1970 and 1999, the Nigerian petroleum industry generated about $231billion in rents for the Nigerian economy in constant 1999 dollars or $1900 for every man, woman and child. Prior to the advent of oil production, the Nigerian economy was dominated by foreign monopoly capital.

Odularu (2008) thus analyses the relationship between the oil sector and Nigeria's economic performance and finds a significant positive relationship between the oil industry and Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This is captured in the table below.

The Gross Domestic Product is measured by its output less the cost of input materials, equipment's, services, etc. purchased from other industries or branches of activity, deduction of any taxes, net of subsidies paid and factor payments made abroad (Odularu, 2008: 11). In addition to the GDP, oil also contributes to the enhancement of Nigeria's purchasing power by means of local expenditure on goods and services.

Highly industrialized nations requires massive amount of petroleum resources to sustain their economic hegemony. This is exemplified in the U.S. quest for oil; the United States consumes about 20 million barrels of oil per day (MBD) or 7.2 billion barrels which accounts for 45% of petroleum products; distillate fuel oil (eg.diesel fuel) accounts for 19%, liquefied petroleum gases 10%, aviation fuel 8% and a variety of other uses combined 18% (Parry and Darmstadter, 2003). Available evidence shows that the United States is the world's largest oil consumer accounting for 25.4% of world consumption (Klare, 2004; Parry and Darmstadter, 2003; Lubeck, P; Watts, M; and Lipschutz, 2001; Braml, 2007; Dewey and Slocum, 2000).

Table 2: Twenty Most Oil Dependent Countries (Fuel Exports as a Percentage of GDP)

S/N	COUNTRIES	PERCENTAGE OF GDP
1.	BAHRAIN	50.9
2.	TURKMENISTAN	49.7
3.	NIGERIA	48.7
4.	SAUDI ARABIA	44.7
5.	TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	41.1
6.	ALGERIA	35.7
7.	AZERBAIJAN	28.3
8.	KAZAKHSTAN	27.0
9.	IRAN, ISLAMIC REP	25.3
10.	NORWAY	23.7
11.	VENEZUELA, RB	22.7
12.	RUSSIAN FEDERATION	21.5
13.	SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC	19.1
14.	ECUADOR	17.6
15.	PAPUA NEW GUINEA	14.9
16.	MALAYSIA	10.5
17.	INDONESIAN	10.3
18.	COTE D'IVORE	8.8
19.	LITHUANIA	7.0
20.	COLOMBIA	6.6

SOURCE: Ross, M. (2003:19) Nigeria's Oil Sector and the Poor in Nigeria: Drivers of Change Program. UK: DFID

Parry and Darmstadker (2003) findings also shows that the United States imports 11.6 million barrels of petroleum per day or 59% of its consumption, compared with 23% in 1970 and that 47% of U.S oil imports currently come from OPEC countries and about half of OPEC imports come from the Persian Gulf with Saudi Arabia being the dominant exporter, while Canada and Mexico combined supply about half of non OPEC imports to the United States. The table describes the scenario.

Table 3: Oil Supply and Reserves by Region, 2001

Region/Country	Current Production		Known Economic Reserves	
	Million Barrels per day	% of World Total	Billion Barrels	% of World Total
SELECTED OPEC PRODUCERS				
IRAN	3.7	5.5	99.1	9.7
IRAQ	2.4	3.6	115	11.3
KUWAIT	2.0	3.0	98.8	9.7
SAUDI ARABIA	8.0	11.8	261.7	25.7
UNITED ARAB EMIRATE	2.3	3.3	62.8	6.2
PERSIAN GULF TOTAL	19.2	28.2	652.0	64.0
VENEZUELA	2.9	4.2	50.2	4.9
NIGERIA	2.3	3.3	30.0	2.9
NON PERSIAN GULF TOTAL	9.1	13.4	107.0	10.5
OPEC TOTAL	28.3	41.6	759.0	74.4
SELECTED NON OPEC PRODUCERS				
CANADA	2.0	3.0	5.4	0.5
CHINA	3.3	4.8	29.5	2.9
MEXICO	3.1	4.6	23.1	2.3
NORWAY	3.2	4.7	10.3	1.0
FORMER USSR	0.0	0.0	13.2	1.3
RUSSIA	7.1	0.4	53.9	5.3
UNITED KINGDOM	2.3	3.3	4.6	0.5
UNITED STATES	5.9	8.6	22.4	2.2
	39.8	58.4	260.8	25.6
WORLD TOTAL	68.1	100.0	1018.7	100.0

SOURCE: Parry and Damstadker (2003: 34) the Cost of U.S. Oil Dependency, Discussion Paper 03-59, Washington DC: Resources for the Future

The OPEC countries produce approximately 42% of the world's oil and of these supplies 68% come from the Persian Gulf. Saudi Arabia produced 8.0 MBD in 2001, while Iran, Iraq, Kuwait and United Arab Emirate each produced between 2.0 and 3.7 MBD. Venezuela and Nigeria are the two largest non-Gulf OPEC producers. The major non OPEC producers are Russia (7.1 MBD in 2001); United States (5.0); China (3.3); Norway (3.2); and Mexico (3.1). It is estimated that the Persian Gulf region has about two thirds of the world's known oil reserve that will be profitable at current prices while the U.S. has only 2 % reserves.

In the early 1950's the United States was still self-reliant in its natural resources, but she had consumed more than ⅓ of her total oil reserves during world war11 (Klare, 2004). So fifty years later more than 60% of the oil consumed in the U.S is delivered from abroad thus posing a threat to U.S. national security and economic vulnerability as well as grave environmental problems (Council on Foreign Affairs, 2006:14).

The EIA (2007) statistics shows that the U.S. currently obtains 15% of its imported oil from Sub-Saharan Africa, and that most of it is from Nigeria and that the U.S. intends to increase oil imports from Africa to one quarter of its total import by 2015. This corroborates the findings of the US department of energy which predicts that by 2025, the U.S. will depend on foreign countries for 70% of its oil (DOE, 2003). In 2006 alone, the U.S. imported 1.045 million barrels per day of oil from Nigeria, which is approximately 10% of U.S. crude import (EIA, 2008). The table below shows the EIA's projection of U.S. oil dependency.

Table 4: Showing U.S. Oil Dependency

Bbl/day	Production 2005	US Import 2005	Production 2020	Production 2025	US Imports
United States	6,830,000	12,960,000 total	9,130,000	8,120,000	18,300,000
Middle East	25,119,000	2,345,000 from	31,570,000	33,980,000	5,730,000 from
West Africa	4,895,000	1,943,000 from	3,700,000	4,300,000	1,080,000 from
Nigeria	2,580,000	1,060,000 (2004	3,400,000	3,800,000	N/A

Source: Energy Information Administration (2006) Annual Energy Outlook, BP Statistical. Review of World Energy

This is an indication that by 2025 U.S. oil consumption is projected to increase by at least 50 percent above today's level of 20 million bbld, and that imports are likely to rise from 12 million bbld to as much as 20 million bb/d, it also shows that more than half of these imports will come from members of OPEC of which 57% will be imported from Persian Gulf and about 42% from Latin America. Interestingly energy experts predict that Nigeria could provide as much as 25 percent of U.S. imports in the future (Jaffe, 2003).

Eight of the top 10 countries with largest proven oil reserves; Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirate and Venezuela (Canada and Russia excepted) are members of OPEC whose oil output are expected to rise (Oil and Gas, 2005: 24). It is argued that although in the medium term, OPEC's share of world oil production is expected to remain at 40 percent, but OPEC's power will be most effective in the long run when non OPEC oil production declines as OPEC controls 70 percent of today's proven reserves worldwide (Oil and Gas, 2005: 25).

This outlook seem to pose real threat to America's energy security and economic interest when dealing with the OPEC cartel, in view of the volatile condition which prevails in the Gulf and the terrorist attacks against the United States embassies in Tanzania on August 7, 1998 as well the attack of the Twin Towers of the world Trade Center and the U.S. defense headquarter, the Pentagon in September 11, 2001 which forced America to expand its energy security policy to include the policy of Global war on Terrorism (GWOT). In acknowledging the strategic importance of Africa to the United States vital interest the U.S. changed its policy of providing logistic support for peace keeping missions in Africa to training for counter terrorism and energy security with a special focus on Nigeria which is the fifth largest supplier of oil to the United States.

With the rising competition for oil commodity, it is projected that in the next two decades, China's oil consumption is expected to grow at a rate of 7.6 percent per year and India 5.5 percent (Klare, 2004). This scenario also necessitated America's new energy policy which is to shift its supply focus from the turbulent Middle East to other areas, notably the Gulf of Guinea as the emerging new market of which Nigeria plays a dominant role. Wihbey 2006 (cited in Lubeck, Watts and Lipshutz, 2007) opines that Nigeria's role in the new scenario is critical because Nigeria and Angola's oil export to U.S. exceeds that of Saudi Arabia and that Nigeria's oil is more preferable for its low sulfur content, most of which is offshore and therefore insulated from domestic crises and quite significantly its transportability and the location of the country which borders the Atlantic, and that locating U.S. military sub regional command in Sao Tome and Principe, will resolve U.S. security question.

Thus, Nigeria is now the biggest U.S. trading partner in Sub Sahara Africa, with its major anchor on high level petroleum imports, while leading U.S. exports to Nigeria are machineries, wheat and motor vehicles and leading U.S. imports from Nigeria were oil and rubber products.

Nigeria's exports to the U.S. under the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), including its generalized system of preference (GSP) provisions were valued at $25.8 billion in the 2006 financial year, which represent a 15% increase over 2005 financial year, which was due to an increase in oil exports, while non-oil AGOA trade involving leather products , species, cassava, yams, beans and wood products amount to $1.4 million in 2006 which made the U.S. the largest investor in Nigeria (www.geographyiq.com/countries/ni/Nigeria-economy-summary.htm).

The U.S. goods trade deficit with Nigeria was $25.7 billion in 2006, an increase of $3 billion from $22.6 billion in 2005. U.S goods exports to Nigeria in 2006 were $2.2 billion, up to 38% from the previous year. U.S. imports from were $27.9 billion in 2006, up from 15% from 2005, which makes Nigeria the largest export market for U.S. goods, while the stock of U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in Nigeria in 2005 was $874 million, down from 2.0 billion in 2004. U.S. FDI in Nigeria is concentrated largely in the mining and wholesale trade sector (www.geographyiq.com/countries/ni/Nigeria-economy-summary.htm).

The U.S. State Department 2010 Report shows that Nigeria is the largest United States trading partner in Sub Saharan Africa with its two- way trade volumes reaching US$34 billion in 2010, representing a 51 percent increase over that of 2009. The report further indicates that the U.S. goods exported to Nigeria in 2010 including cereals (wheat & rice), motor vehicle, petroleum products and machinery were more than US$4b, while U.S import from Nigeria was over US$30b consisting overwhelmingly of crude oil. It stated that cocoa, bauxite and aluminums, tobacco and waxes, rubber and grains amounted to US$73million of U.S imports from Nigeria and that U.S trade deficit with Nigeria in 2010 was US$26b (Punch Newspaper, Wed. 26 Oct 2011).

Nigeria-U.S. trade relations are still dominated by crude oil. Nigeria is a significant U.S. trading partner, accounting as the 5th largest supplier of oil to the United States (Dewey and Slocum, 2000). But as pointed out by Volman (2003) investment in oil production can fuel conflict as there is significant competition to control access to oil rents and that government can afford to buy new arms. The United States needed to sustain an uninterrupted flow of oil commodity from Nigeria in order to maintain its hegemony; to achieve this, the U.S. has to ensure a climate of stability in Nigeria; so in 1999, the State department designated Nigeria as one of four priority countries for U.S. promotion of democracy (Dewey and Slocum, 2000).

Odoh (2008) demonstrates that Nigeria and U.S. relations is embedded in oil, which simply assumes the rhetoric of democracy, human rights and freedom; and that the United States depends on oil imports for its industrial, military, economic and social life in order to secure its core values. This underscores that Nigeria-U.S. relations are based on oil dependency nexus.

Nigeria / U.S. Military Aid

The United States foreign policy and its energy policy are intertwined and indistinguishable (Klare, 2008). According to EUCOM General Jones, Africa plays an increased strategic role militarily, economically and politically. To this end U.S. military involvement in West Africa focuses mainly on three main goals (i) getting U.S. forces on the ground in order to advise and upgrade the region's militaries in support of the GWOT; (ii) establishing maritime dominance in the Gulf of Guinea in order to secure offshore oil installations and if necessary unilaterally defending America's energy assets; and (iii) building or subcontracting access to new air and naval bases, to provide both forward supplies, surveillance and air cover capacities (Lubeck et al, 2007:15).

The United States Government engages the Nigerian State in a military pact towards the theatre security cooperation which is structured to support common national objectives based on security and stability within the West African sub region by adopting a "three prong approach" with the DoD, DoS and USAID providing action package (Ploch, 2009). Also, Loeffler (2009) avers that through the DOD, African partnership station (APS) was created to provide maritime safety and security through training, supply and provision of medical missions to military personnel in West Africa.

Nigeria is also listed in the international military education and training program (IMET). Through IMET, Nigerian military personnel received extensive training in U.S. military strategy, doctrine and tactics. The IMET programs also provided opportunity for members of both militaries a platform for the exchange of good governance and democracy. AFRICOM also set up security cooperation offices, defense attaché, AFRICOM Liaison, bilateral assistance and maritime assistance officers, as well as other activities to further develop trust and partnership (Ward, 2009).

The DOD cooperates with Nigeria through the funded military and military sales programs. In these programs, Nigeria is able to receive funding to procure American made military systems to improve their security network. For the fiscal year (FY 2008), Nigeria received $1.3Million with a projected increase to $1.35M for (FY 2009). In addition, the U.S. delivered four surplus coast guard balsam class coastal patrol ships in 2003 through the excess defense program of the U.S. defense security assistance agency. These ships had a total value of more than $4.1 Million at the time they were delivered to Nigeria (Volman, 2008). The following tables' present data on U.S. financial security assistance programs for Nigeria over the past decade.

Table 5: FY 1999-2002 (Dollars in Millions)

	FY 1999 Actual	FY 2000 Actual	FY 2001 Actual	FY2002 Actual
FMS Agreements	271	3180	6738	8498
FM Construction Sales Agreements				976
FM Deliveries	32	43	3132	3761
FM Construction Sales Deliveries				
FMF		10000	10000	6000
CS Licensed		2	58	8
IMET Deliveries	90	525	663	750
IMET Number of Students	7	115	23	204

Table 6: FY 2003-2006 (Dollars in Millions)

	FY 2003 Actual	FY 2004 Actual	FY 2005 Actual	FY 2006 Actual
FM Agreements	6672	4622	2318	253
FM Construction Sales Agreement				
FM Deliveries	3181	3330	6849	3002
FM Construction Sales Deliveries		44	38	7
FMF				1065
CS Licensed	1502	6	2509	2858
IMET Deliveries	96			926
IMET Number of Students	6			98

Table 7: FY 2007-2010 (Dollars in Millions)

	FY 2007 Actual	FY 2008 Actual	FY 2009 Est.	FY 2010 Request
FMS Agreement	724	285	N/A	N/A
FMS Construction Sales Agreement			N/A	N/A
FMS Deliveries	4025	564	N/A	N/A
FMF Construction Sales Deliveries	2		N/A	N/A
FMF	1200	1339	1350	1350
CS Licensed	3631		N/A	N/A
IMET Deliveries	695	812	850	1100
IMET Number of Students	62	35	N/A	N/A

Source: U.S. Defense Security Assistance Agency, Historical Fact Book 30, 2008 and US Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year, 2010

Abbreviations:
CS = Commercial Sales
Est. = Estimate
FM = Foreign Military
FMF = Foreign Military Financing
FMS = Foreign Military Sales
IMET = International Military Education and Training
N/A = Not Available

Source: (http://crossedcrocodiles.wordpress.com/2010/04/04/supplying-arms-and-military-training-the-us-gift-to-africa/).

Lubeck et al,(2007:20) asserts that the U.S. military patrols the Gulf of Guinea and trains Nigerian security forces in the Delta with the help of American advisors. On the likely effect of such alliance, Rothschild and Lawson (1994) argues that increased military assistance by the United States may dialectically promote disorder as military strengthening of African states may lead to further societal disengagement, thereby weakening the states in the long term. Given the precarious security setting in the Delta, it also seems the U.S military industrial complex benefits.

Etekpe (2007) thus argues that whereas the cost of conflict in terms of loss of lives and properties have become too high for tolerance, the amount of money and profit from arms export/dealers of both industrial and developing countries have increased tremendously which supports the perception that arms exporters and dealers are largely responsible for over 70 percent of wars or violent conflicts especially in Africa. He reiterates that this scenario is evident in the Niger Delta where it was alleged that the United States used six sophisticated warships and helicopters against militant groups and that former President Olusegun Obasanjo unilaterally approved $2 billion for the importation of arms to fight militants in the Niger Delta.

Also in 2009, the Yaradua's administration procured arsenals of intelligence planes, warships and helicopter gunships from Israel, Malaysia, Singapore, Holland and Russia to match attack by the militants (Daily Independent, September, 15th 2009; This Day, November,26th 2009). The table below shows the global exporters of arms.

Table 8: Global Exporters of Weapons in 1996-2001

Ranking	Exporters	Exports US $Billions	Share of World Trade
1	United States of America	54	45%
2	Russian Federation	21	17%
3	France	11	9%
4	United Kingdom	8	7%
5	Germany	6	5%
6	Others, including developing countries	20	17%
	Total	121	100

Source: SIPRI Report adopted from Human Development Report (2002:89) cited in Etekpe (2007)

The table shows that from 1996 to 2001, the United States and Russia have dominated the arms market, ranking first and second followed by France, accounting for 45%, 17% and 9% respectively, while all the developing nation's share account for only a tiny fraction. Extant literature also indicates that developing nations continue to be the primary focus of foreign arm sales activity by weapon suppliers. For instance, the findings of Grimmett (2009) also shows that during the period 2001-2004, developing nations accounted for 58.4% of the values of all global arms transfer agreement, while in 2005 to 2008 developing nations account for 76.4% of all arms transfer agreement and the U.S. ranked first in arms transfer agreement with developing nations netting $29.6 billion or 70.1 % of these agreements.

In the second place was Russia with $3.3 billion or 7.8% of such agreements and France which came third with $5 billion or 5.9 billion or 5.9% in 2008; in the area of arms deliveries, the U.S also ranked first with a value of 7.4 billion or 40.9 % of the value of all such deliveries, while Russia came second at $5.2 billion or 28.5% of all deliveries and the target are OPEC. In 2008, the United Arab Emirates ranked first in the value of arms transfer agreements among developing nations weapons purchasers, concluding $9.7 billion in such agreements. Saudi Arabia followed with $8.7 billion of such agreement.

This denotes that the arms market is a profitable industry for arms exporting countries. Tabb (2001:98) aptly stated that "of the twenty four countries that experienced at least one armed conflict in 1997… the U.S sold weapons and provided military training to at least twenty one… at some point during the 1990s.

Capacity of the Nigerian Government to Mediate Conflicts and Enforce International Law.

The Niger Delta is rife with conflict and these conflicts revolve primarily over resources. Although the origin of armed conflict has its root in the early mercantile era when the city state kings of the region battled British imperialist attempt to monopolize the trade in palm oil to the exclusion of the Niger Delta kings and middle men (UNDP, 2006: 346). UNDP (2006: 345) noted that today the region has become far more volatile due to years of deprivation which have pushed the citizens into anger, hopelessness, cynicism and violence.

Oil corporations in corroboration with private security firms tend to create conflict in the Niger Delta through their activities. Okonta and Douglas (2001:81) showed how four members of Shell police testified to Project Underground, that Shell officials would give bribe and befriend villagers wherever there is an oil spill. These villagers would then instigate conflict in the villages over competing claims for oil benefit, a situation which Shell would then exploit, claiming that it would not pay any compensation since the community is divided over the issue of who gets what. The officers also revealed how their special strike force would be deployed to suppress community protest armed with automatic weapons and teargas.

Former Ogoni members of the Shell police have claimed that they were involved in deliberately creating conflict between different groups of people and intimidating and harassing protesters during the height of the MOSOP protests in 1993 and 1994 (Human Rights Watch, 1999). Apart from official government import, the inflow of arms into the Niger Delta has been through illegal arms trafficking involving racketeers and the oil corporations. Shell for instance, maintains its own private police force, imports its own arms and ammunition and also makes payment to the Nigerian military. (HRW, 1999)

Evidence from litigation, involving XM Federal Limited v Shell showed that Shell negotiated the import of weapons into the country in clear breach of an arms embargo between 1993 and 1995. According to the material evidence, Shell had sought tenders from Humanitex Nig.ltd to acquire weapons worth US $500,000. These included 130 Beretta 9mm caliber sub machine guns, 200,000 rounds of bullets and 500 smoke hand grenades. Nigeria Inspector General of Police approved the arms purchase under pressure from Shell managers (Frynas, 2000: 55).

In response to allegations relating to the import of weapons, Shell stated that it had in the past imported side arms on behalf of the Nigerian police for use by the "supernumerary police" who are on attachment to Shell and guard the company's facilities. . . It stated to Human Rights Watch, that it "cannot give an undertaking not to provide weapons in the future, as due to the deteriorating security situation in Nigeria, we may want to see the weapons currently used by the police who protect Shell people and property upgraded" (HRW, 1999:13,14).

Chevron Nigeria stated in correspondence with Human Right Watch, that it has "a running contract with some private security companies for the protection of company asset against theft and to control access to our premise. CNL does not have a running contract with any government security agency". Mobil similarly divulged that "under the joint operations agreement and also in the interest of Mobil employees, contractors are in order to safeguard our facilities against theft and sabotage; we make efforts to provide adequate security facilities in our areas of operations. We do have a security department. Elf on its part stated that it uses landlords and community guards to secure its well heads and installation and these local guards are paid 500 percent above the national income wage (HRW, 1999:105).

The high point of these is the fabricating of a security complex which turns the Niger Delta into a militarized zone. Ekine (2001:19) aptly stated that: "Shell and other oil companies, especially Elf and Chevron, have shown their open hostility and disregard for local communities by working hand in hand with the Nigerian military, providing them weapons, transport, logistical support and financial payments in order to commit acts of violence against people and property, in turn the military serve as a personal security force to oil workers". The Nigerian state in cooperation with the oil corporations' unleashed waves of terror on the people against what it perceives as threats to oil flow.

In October, 1990 the village of Umuechem in Rivers state was completely razed by the Mobile Police Force, destroying 495 homes and leaving at least 80 villagers dead during a demonstration for development projects from Shell (Amnesty international, 1994: 7, 8; HRW, 1999:112). The killings and brutal repression of the Ogonis in Rivers state by the Internal Security Task Force was well documented and widely reported. The head of the Task Force, Major Paul Okuntimo wrote a secret memo to the Rivers state military administrator on May 12 1994: "Shell operations still impossible unless ruthless military operations are undertaken for smooth economic activity to commence…" In a few weeks the task force had raided almost all the 126 Ogoni villages. The soldiers massacred, raped and looted. CLO (1996:18) and Carew (2002) gave a graphic account:

The Nigerian security forces attacked, burned and destroyed several Ogoni villages and homes under the pretext of dislodging officials and supporters of the Movement of the Survival of Ogoni people (MOSOP). These attacks have come in response to MOSOP's non-violent campaign in opposition to the destruction of their environment by oil companies. Some of the attacks have involved combined forces of the police, the army, the air force, and the navy, armed with armoured tanks and other sophisticated weapons. In other instances, the attacks have been conducted by unidentified gunmen, mostly at night.

The Nigerian government in essence placed its "legal and military powers . . . at the disposal of the oil companies" and allowed "ruthless military operations" against the Ogoni people (African Commission Decision, 2001). Nigeria was subsequently, suspended from the commonwealth in November,1995 following the extra-judicial killing of human rights activist Ken Saro Wiwa and other Ogonis. The suspension however, does not in any way restrain the Nigerian state and the oil corporations as many other communities in the Niger Delta are given the same dose of treatment. In the case of Odi, in Bayelsa state, grenades, long and short missiles with biological reagents were used in the invasion and destruction of Odi town in 1999 (Briggs, 2002).

Similarly, disturbances in Iko, Akwa Ibom state, following protest against Shell over a badly malfunctioning flare led to the burning of fourty houses by the mobile police (ERA, 1998). Also, in February 1999, Human Rights Watch documented an incident involving soldiers using a chevron helicopter and chevron boats to attack villagers in two communities in Delta state, Opia and Ikenyan, killing at least four people and burning most of the villages to the ground (Hrw.org/press/1999/Feb./nig0223.htm).

In other cases people were tortured and subjected to arbitrarily detention for lengthy periods for protesting against oil companies, for instance, the case of Egbema in Imo state in 1999; Obagi, Brass, Nembe Creek and Rumuobiokani in 1995 (HRW,1999; HRW, 1995). These clearly highlight a connection between oil corporations, militarism, armed conflicts and anti-democratic politics (Banfield, et.al, 2003; Bannon and Collier, 2003; Singer, 2003; Banfield and Champaign, 2004; Nitzan and Bichler, 1999; HRW, 2003).

This clearly, shows that the Nigerian State is caught up in the web of international capital and with the collaboration of the United States Government, it has not only failed in enforcing the liability of oil corporations for violations of international law but has itself acted as catalyst in armed conflict and violations of international law in the Niger Delta. It was claimed that the Nigerian government had even admitted its role in the violent operation in several memos exchanged between officials of the SPDC and the Rivers state internal security task force during the Ogoni crisis (HRW, 1999), and also the incapacity of the Nigerian legal and administrative system to enforce international treaties on oil transnational corporations operating in Nigeria's Niger Delta.

In a landmark decision of the 30th ordinary session of the African Commission of Human and People's Rights , Banjul, 13-27 October 2001, Nigeria was found to have breached the right to non-discrimination (Art 2), the right to respect for life and the integrity of person (Art 4), the right to property (Art 14), the right to health (Art 16) the right to protection of the family unit (Art 18(1), the right of people to freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources (Art 21), the right to food, the right to housing, and the right to a general satisfactory environment favourable to their development (Art 24). The commission therefore called on the Nigerian government to enforce adequate compensation to victims of the human right violations, and to undertake a complete clean up and remediation of lands and rivers damaged by oil explorations including the provision of information on health and environmental risks as well as meaningful access to regulatory and decision making bodies for communities likely to be affected by oil activities.

The recognition of corporate liability by the African Commission of Human and peoples Right and the fact that these violations still persist despite the ACHPR verdict provides a clear indication of the inability of the Nigerian government to enforce international law. Ibeanu and Egwu (2007: 49, 50) also pointed out that: "Nigeria lags behind in its reporting obligations under all the major international human rights treaty applicable to it.

CONCLUSION

This paper contends that the United States government and the Nigerian government trade relations and the need to protect U.S. investments in Nigeria drive the U.S policy of increase military aid to Nigeria which weakens the state by promoting societal disengagement. Statistical findings predicts that by 2025, U.S. oil consumption is projected to rise by at least 50 percent above today's level of 20 million bb/d; and that imports are likely to rise from 12 million bb/d to as much as 20 million bb/d. The findings suggest that the U.S will likely depend on Nigeria to provide as much as 25 percent of U.S. import. In 2006 alone, the U.S. imported 1.045 million b/d of oil from Nigeria, which is about 10 percent of U.S. crude import.

Thus, in order for the United States to safeguard the uninterrupted access to Nigeria's oil, the United States Government engages in a military security pact with the Nigerian government and has also stationed U.S. military personnel in the Gulf of Guinea and trains Nigerian Security forces to serve as surrogate to defend U.S oil interest and to prosecute U.S war on global terrorism. Accordingly, the findings of the study shows that the U.S. Government's dependence on Nigeria's oil and its military treaty with the Nigerian government for oil security puts on hold Nigeria's government capacity to mediate oil conflict and to enforce the liability of oil corporations for violations of international law in Nigeria.

References

Amnesty International (2009) Nigeria: Petroleum, Pollution and Poverty In the Niger Delta, London: Amnesty International Publication.

Banfied, J. and Champion, P (2004) what role for oil majors in supporting sustainable peace in Angola? London: International Alert.

Banfield, J. et al. (2003) Transnational Corporations in conflict zones. London: International Alert

Barnett, M. & Wendt A. (1992) "The Systematic Sources of Dependent Militarization" In Brian Job (Eds) the Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Bannon, I. and Collier, P. (2003) Natural Resources and violent conflicts. Washington DC: World Bank

Briggs, D. A (2002) the Use of Military Force in the Post Military Rule in Nigeria: The Anatomy of the Sacking of Odi Town, Niger Delta, Paper Presented at CASS Informational Conference on Assessment of Nigeria Democratic Journey So Far, Feb. 18th – 21st.

Braml, I. (2007) "Can the United States Shed its Oil Addiction", the Washington Quarterly, (30)4

Dommen, C. (1998) Claiming Environmental Rights: Some Possibilities Offered by the United

Nations Human Rights Mechanisms, 11, Geo.Int'L Environmental Law Review Engdahl, W. (2004) a Century of War, London: Pluto

Ekine, S. (2001) Blood and Oil: Testimonies of Violence From Women Of The Niger Delta. London: Centre for Democracy and Development.

Etekpe, A. (2007) the politics and Conflicts over Gas in the Niger Delta Region: The case of Bayelsa State, 1990-2006. Port Harcourt: Tower Gate Resources

Environmental Rights Action, (1998) Shell in IKO, Benin: ERA

Frynas, J.G (2000) Oil in Nigeria: Conflict and Litigation between Oil Companies and Village Communities, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers.

Nitzan, J. and Bichler, S. (1999) the Global Political Economy of Israel, London: Zeb Books

Nordstrom, C. (2004) Shadows of War: Violence, Power and International profiteering in the Twenty-first Century. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Okonta, I and Douglas, O. (2001) where Vultures Feast: 40 years of Shell in the Niger Delta. Benin: Environmental Rights Action

Paul, J.A and Garred, J (2000) "Making corporations Accountable", A background Paper for the United Nations Financing for Development Process: Global Policy Forum

Pelletiere, S (2004) America's Oil Wars, Boulder: West View Press.

Rowell, A. et al (2005) the Next Gulf: London, Washington and the Oil Conflict in Nigeria, London: Constable & Robinson Ltd.

Tabb, W. K. (2001) The Amoral Elephant: Globalization and the struggle for social Justice in the twenty first Century. New York: Monthly Review Press

Carew, K.S.A (2002) "David and Goliath: Giving the Indigenous People of the Niger Delta a Smooth Pebble" Environmental Law, Human Rights and Redefining the Value of Life, 7 Drake Journal of Agric. Law.

Cooper, N. (2002) "the business of war", in Ploughshares Monitor, Vol.23, No.3

Eaton, J. P 1997) the Nigerian Tragedy, Environmental Regulation of Transnational Corporations and Human Right to a Healthy Environment, 15, Boston University, Int'L Law Journal

Fowler, R. (1995) International Environmental Standards for Transnational Corporations, 25 Environmental Law

Frey, B (1997) the legal and Ethical Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations in the Protection of International Human Rights, 6 Minnesota Journal of Global Trade

Frynas, J.G. (2001) Corporate and State Response to Anti Oil Protest in Nigeria, African Affairs

Ibeanu, O. and Egwu, S. (2007) Popular Perceptions of Democracy and Political Governance in Nigeria. Abuja: Centre for Democracy and Development.

Jaffe, Craig (2003) "In Massive Shift, U.S. Is Planning to Cut the Size of Military in Germany", Wall Street Journal, 10, June.

Juma, L. (2007) "Shadow Networks and Conflict Resolution in the Great Lakes Region of Africa", African Security Review, vol.16, No.1

Kamminga, M.T (2004) corporate obligations under International law, Paper presented at 71st International law association conference, Berlin.

Klare, M (2001) Resource Wars, New York: Metropolitan Books

Kinley, D & Tadaki, J (2004) 'From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights Responsibilities at International Law, 44, VA. Journal of International Law.

Le Billion, P. (2001) "Thriving on War: The Angolan Conflict and Private Business" Review of African Political Economy, No.90, Vol.28.

Macogonor, C. U. (2000) "International Law, Multinational Corporations and the Niger Delta Crisis: The case of Choba Community and Wilbros Corporation," Journal of the Niger Delta Research (JONDR) IFS, RSUST, Vol.2, No1

Mann, M. (2003) Incoherent Empire, London: Verso.

Mowery, L. (2002)" Earth Rights, Human Rights: Can International Environmental Human Rights affect Corporate Accountability?" 13, Fordham Envtl Law Journal

Reno, W (2003) "Political Networks in a Failing State: The Roots and Future of Violent Conflict in Sierra Leone", Internationale Politik and Gesellschaft, No.2

Rothchild, D. & Lawson, L. (1994) "The Interactions between State and civil society in Africa: From

Deadlock to new routines". In civil society and the state in Africa (Eds) Harbeson, D. Harbeson, Naomi

Chaza, Boulders colo: Lynne Reinner

Shelton, D. (2002) "Protecting Human Rights in A Globalized World", 25, BC Int'L & Comp. Law Rev.

Volman, D. (1997) "Peace and Military Policy in Africa", Foreign Policy in Focus, Washington: Institute for Policy Studies

Volman, D. (2003) Oil, Arms and Violence in Africa. http://www. Prairienet.org/acas/military/oilandarms.pdf

Volman, D. (2008) "Africa: U.S. Security Assistance Programmes: The FY 2009 DoS and DOD Budget Request". African Security Research Project.

http://africa.com/stories/200803131262.html

Volman, 2008, "Africom: The New US Military Command for Africa" Africa Security Research Project, (http://concernedafricascholars.org/african-security-research-project/?p=12).

Council on Foreign Relations (2006) National Security Consequence of U.S. Oil Dependency, Independent Task Force Report, No.58.

Civil Liberties Organization (1996) Ogoni Trials and Travails, Lagos: Department of Energy (2003) International Energy Outlook.

Dewey, A. E and Slocum, G. (2000) "The Role of Transition Assistance: The Case of Nigeria." Centre for Development Information and Evaluation, Working Paper, No.325

Energy Information Administration (2008) U.S. Crude Oil Imports by Country of Origin.

Lubeck, P; Watts, M. and Lipschutz (2007) "Convergent Interest U.S. Energy Security and the securing of Nigeria's Democracy"; Centre for International Policy

Parry, W.H and Darmstadter, J. (2003) The Cost of U.S. Oil Dependency, Discussion Paper 03-59, Washington DC: Resources For the Future

Ploch, L. (2009) "Africa command: U.S. Strategic Interest and the role of the U.S. Military in Africa." CRS Report RL43003. Washington D.C: Congressional Research Service, 5, January.

Ross, M. (2003) "Nigeria's Oil Sector and the Poor", Paper Presented to the U.K. Department for International Development, Nigeria: Drivers for Change Program.

Human Rights Watch, (1999) The Price of Oil: Corporate Responsibility and Human Rights Violations in Nigeria's Oil Producing Communities, USA: Human Rights Watch.

Human Rights Watch, (2003) Sudan, Oil and Human Rights, USA: Human Rights Watch

African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (2001) Decision on Communication of the Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) and the Centre for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) V Nigeria (155/96), Para 54. The decision was adopted at the 30th ordinary session of the African Commission of Human and Peoples' Rights, Banjul,13-27 October 2001 (SERAC and CESR v Nigeria), Available at http:www1.umn.edu/humanrts/Africa/comcases/155-96b.htm\

Grimmett, R. (2009) Conventional Arms Transfer to Developing Nations, 2001-2008, Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress. www.global issues.org/article/74/the-arms-trade-is-big-business.

Loeffler, W. (2009) "Foreign Press Centre Briefing on Africa Partnership Station, Maritime Capacity Building in Africa": U.S. Fed News Service, htpp://www.proquest.umi.com

Odularu, G. (2007) "Crude Oil and the Nigeria's Economic Performance," Oil and Business http://www.ogbus.ru/eng/

United Nations Development Programme (2001) UNDP and Civil Society Organizations: A Practice Note on Engagement. www.undp.org/cso/resource/policies/undpcsopolicy.doc

United Nations Development Programme (2006) Niger Delta Human Development Report, Abuja: UN House.

Ward, W.E (2009) "United States Africa Command Brief"
http://www.africom.mil/pdffiles/2009%20command%Brief.pdf

Odoh, S. I. (2008) "Oil Politics and Nigeria-United States Relations, 1999-2007", A Ph.D Dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka.