EQUILIBRIUM DETERMINATION, TWO-SIDED MARKETS AND PLATFORMS COMPETITION: THE NIGERIAN MOBILE COMMUNICATION MARKET

Authors

  • Atsiya Amos The University of York , United Kingdom
  • Francis Audu Akawu Nasarawa State University Keffi

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.14738/assrj.512.5706

Keywords:

Two-sided markets, multi-homing, platform competition

Abstract

This study develops a theoretical model for analyzing two-sided markets that allow for global multi-homing among agents in a mobile communication market. The model explains the determination of equilibrium outcome, price structure and consumer surplus given competitive platforms and non-exclusivity of services in the Nigerian Mobile communication market. Multiple equilibria, as well as maximum platform profit from monopoly rent with associated deadweight losses on the side of the buyers, are feasible given the market structure.  The existing pricing structure is seemingly suboptimal of a social welfare. The unique characteristic of the market having mixed features of monopoly and perfect competition appears to be critical in reaching the theoretical model outcome. Consumer welfare is likely to be promoted with strict enforcement of anti-trust policy needed to regulate any form of collusion. 

Author Biographies

Atsiya Amos, The University of York , United Kingdom

A PhD researcher with the Department of Economics, University of York,

Francis Audu Akawu, Nasarawa State University Keffi

A Professor of Economics and Immediate past Director of General Studies, Nasarawa State University Keffi Nigeria

References

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Published

2018-12-10

How to Cite

Amos, A., & Akawu, F. A. (2018). EQUILIBRIUM DETERMINATION, TWO-SIDED MARKETS AND PLATFORMS COMPETITION: THE NIGERIAN MOBILE COMMUNICATION MARKET. Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal, 5(12). https://doi.org/10.14738/assrj.512.5706