The Impact of Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance on Corporate Performance: An Empirical Evidence from the Data of Chinese Listed Financial Enterprises

Authors

  • Zhe Sun Central University of Finance and Economics

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.14738/assrj.71.7427

Keywords:

Bank and Insurance Companies; Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance; Influencing Factors; Corporate performance

Abstract

 Based on data of the listed banks and insurance companies from 2011-2016, this paper studies the factors affecting directors’ and officers’ liability insurance, the relationship between directors’ and officers’ liability insurance and corporate performance. Empirical research shows that there is a significant positive correlation between the company’s asset-liability ratio, corporate performance and directors’ and officers’ liability insurance. Directors’ and officers’ liability insurance has a significant positive effect on corporate performance of listed banks and insurance companies. The empirical findings of this paper will help to strengthen the understanding of directors’ and officers’ liability insurance in bank and insurance companies and promote the widespread use of directors’ and officers’ liability insurance in the future.

References

[1] Holderness, C.. Liability Insurers as Corporate Monitors. International Review of Law and Economics, 1990, 10: 115-129.
[2] Core J E. The Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance Premium: An Outside Assessment of the Quality of Corporate Governance. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2000, 16(2): 449-277.
[3] O’Sullivan Noel. Insuring the Agents: The Role of Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance in Corporate Governance. The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 1997, 64(3): 545-556.
[4] Lu,J.H., and D.Horng.The Role of Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance in Corporate Governance: Evidence from the High-tech Industry in Taiwan. International Journal Of Technology Management,2007, 40 (1) : 229-247.
[5] Zou Hong, Sonia Wong, Clement Shum, et al. Controlling Minority Shareholder Incentive Conflicts and Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance: Evidence from China. Journal of Banking & Finance, 2008, 32(12) : 2636-2645.
[6] Xu Rong, Wang Jie. Research on the Interaction between Directors' Liability Insurance and Corporate Governance Mechanism - Evidence from A-share Listed Companies in China. Insurance Research, 2012 (3): 68-78.
[7] Hu Guoliu, Hu Jun. Directors' Liability Insurance and Corporate Performance Based on the Experience of A-share Companies in China. Economic Review, 2014 (5): 136-147.
[8] Chen,T.J., and S.H.Li. Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance. International Journal of Disclosure & Governance, 2010, 7(3) : 244-261.
[9] Lee S Y, Liu C L. D&O Insurance, Excess Director Compensation and Firm Value: Evidence from Taiwan. National Chiao Tung University, Working Paper, 2014.
[10] Jia Ning, Liang ChuChu. Directors' Liability Insurance, Institutional Environment and Corporate Governance - Based on the Perspective of Earnings Management of Chinese Listed Companies. Insurance Research, 2013 (7): 57-67.
[11] Zhao Yang, John Hu. Director and Executive Liability Insurance: Incentive or Self-interest? Based on the Empirical Test of Chinese Listed Companies. China Soft Science, 2014 (9): 147-164.
[12] Ling Shixian, Bai Ruifeng. Directors' Liability Insurance and Corporate Performance: Empirical Test Based on Empirical Data of Chinese Listed Companies. Business Economy, 2017 (10): 78-86.
[13] Bhagat, S., Brickley, J., Coles, J. Management Identification and Liability insurance: The Effect on Stockholder Wealth. Journal of Risk and Insurance , 1987, 54: 721-736.
[14] Chung, H., Wynn, J. Managerial Legal Liability Coverage and Earnings Conservatism. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2008, 46: 135-153.
[15] Hu guoliu, Li Shaohua. Can Directors' Liability Insurance Improve the Efficiency of Enterprise Investment? - Based on the Empirical Evidence of A-share Listed Companies in China. Journal of Hunan University (Social Science Edition), 2014 (3): 41-46.
[16] Ling Shixian, Bai Ruifeng. Corporate Governance Role of Directors' Executive Liability Insurance - Based on the Perspective of Dual Agency Cost [J]. Finance and Trade Economy, 2017 (12): 95-110.
[17] Deng Xiaohui, Li Haohao. Review of Liability Insurance System for Directors and Officers. Foreign Economy and Management, 2002 (8): 39-44.
[18] Wang Youru. Summary of Research on Directors' Liability Insurance Demand. Insurance Research, 2007 (7): 33-37.
[19] Pan Xiaoying, Zhang Changhai. The Nature of Property Rights, Directors and Executives Liability Insurance and Diversified Investment. Financial Theory and Practice, 2016 (3): 89-95.

Downloads

Published

2020-01-13

How to Cite

Sun, Z. (2020). The Impact of Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance on Corporate Performance: An Empirical Evidence from the Data of Chinese Listed Financial Enterprises. Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal, 7(1), 35–45. https://doi.org/10.14738/assrj.71.7427