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Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal – Vol.7, No.11

Publication Date: November 25, 2020

DOI:10.14738/assrj.711.9358.

Kioukias, D. K. (2020). Some Observations on the Good and Bad Chances of Feasible Social Engineering. Advances in Social Sciences

Research Journal, 7(11) 343-348.

Some Observations on the Good and Bad Chances of Feasible Social

Engineering

Dimitris K. Kioukias

Hellenic Open University

ABSTRACT

We attempt to discuss anew the idea of engaging in total social

transformation without regard to huge human cost. We argue that

“social engineering” entails much more risk than useful achievement,

for our destructive capabilities exceed our creativity potential. To

support the argument we draw some parallels between key social and

political phenomena with aesthetic, communicative, or legal ones.

Especially dangerous seems to be a partial appropriation of time, space

and history, or a full disregard of them in efforts to change society. In the

end we come to the conclusion that, while social manufacturing is

feasible, at least to a certain extent, the end result of the process is quite

often no better than the previous state of affairs. Therefore, the question

of human capacity to effect social transformation should be

accompanied by the question “with which specific result”.

Keywords: social manufacturing, social engineering, social results, creative

capabilities, destructive capabilities, history, aesthetics, law, communication.

“Where the Idea remains abstract, having not in itself the specific and suiting inly it way

of expression” (G.W.F. Hegel)

INTRODUCTION

God made man and woman, Rose Vadim made Brigitte Bardot a woman (Bardot Wikipedia),

geneticists can produce new animals and some avant garde intellectuals aspire to manufacture

entire societies. As a matter of fact, technological progress in the more material world traditionally

inspired analogous experiments in the social realm. Thus, for example, Modernity has often been

identified with progress in the natural sciences (Hall & Gieben 2003: ch. 1). It was then supposed

that a brand new society was born based on reason and science. Also, more recently due to the

intellectual current called “postmodernism” (e.g. Lash & Friedman 1996: 3) tradition based

institutions appeared strongly delegitimized with some people coming to the conclusion that

everything in society can be remade and appear new. In this sense a “migadic” society is perfectly

feasible, as social archetypes and roles may be socially modified. What is more, so the story goes,

what can be manufactured must acquire the status of an unbeatable socio-political ideal, a kind of

golden lamb to be adored by the populace. For it is characteristic of some kind of revolutionaries

that they cannot tolerate the past, save for cases they can reinterpreted it, i.e. remake it.

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Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal (ASSRJ) Vol.7, Issue 11, November-2020

The issue has been handled by various historical figures on particular occasions which appeared as

landmarks in the history of knowledge. Take, for instance, the quarrel between ancient Greek

rationalists and some sophists (Kioukias 2018), or the critique exercised over revolutionary

regimes, either the French Revolution, or the Russian one. Such prominent historical and political

thinkers as E. Burke, Alexis de Tocqueville, C. Popper, to mention but a few, strongly doubted the

idea of a an artificial social blueprint (Burke in Ball & Dagger 1991: 135 ff.), de Tocqueville 1991,

Popper 1980). Their “opponents”, notably the Enlightenment thinkers, believed in social progress,

but accepted the notion of universal human roles (Hall & Gieben 2003: 57). The Greek classics

(Kioukias 2018) were also predisposed towards social institutions which stood the test of

endurance over time, in spite of the fact that they themselves were quite innovating, not to mention

they probably introduced a first kind of Enlightenment. As a matter of fact, they largely focused on

the individual and reason (Sinclair 1951:19, Kioukias 2018:14).

A key characteristic of the discussion is the perception of law from each point of view. While to

classical writers law seems to be a product of maturity coupled by reason, to “modernists” law is

yet another instrument, ready to use to effect social change. This means that in the former case law

is not entirely separated from habit, while in the latter this is of no concern: You can legislate just

what you like. Law that is, is like a magical thing capable of transforming this into that. Law is

chemistry! Thus, for example, if for centuries minor violations of law, or morality, were punished

mildly, today this must be of no concern. For, we tend to believe in immense punishments and, more

generally, smart “multipliers” (as in economy, private law, etc.). It is as if we try to replace human

time by a universal one.

To what extent such claims may be realistic is a key question in this paper, examined, of course, in

broad lines-in principle. Examining to this end a number of social relationships can hopefully bring

fresh light into the discussion and thereby a number of political decisions which acquire the status

of law and regulate modern life. Before we enter into concrete social relationships, we intend to

discuss the matter in somehow more abstract terms, providing examples of feasible and unfeasible

transformations.

CAN I CHANGE IT?

Which materials can be changed and how is a question notably answered by natural science. We

cannot, of course, enter into this vast area, but at least we understand that a stone cannot generate

a new stone. We must admit that there are things which remain still. Thus stones we see today are

the same as seen thousand years ago. Without a moving force there cannot be any change in the

material world. Or, if you like it in Latin, “ex nihilo nihil fit” (Markantonatos 2019), i.e. from nothing

comes nothing. In a materialist philosophy we may consider the same. If intellectual loopholes may

be invented to refute this argument, the example of the stone is quite strong. If now thousands of

years are needed to change a stone, in social life this is not an acceptable time measure.

As a matter of fact, we cannot as yet abundantly change the course of time. We may, of course, speed

it up, through our machines of transportation and observation, but not to such extent as to achieve

immortality-this requires no time limits. We cannot visit the past either; we still need to rely on

historians and our natural mental tools. We can only use statistics to pretend we are able to control

time. We also try methods of ex ante forecasting and planning as well as prefabricated coincidences,

sometimes successfully, sometimes not so much so, if we judge from the poor results. Thus, in a